Wednesday June 19th 2013

Posts Tagged ‘Angela Merkel’

De willekeur van drie procent

Eén van de ironieën van de sinds afgelopen weekend ontstane politieke crisis waar Nederland zich in bevindt, is dat ik – en ik niet alleen – het eigenlijk wel eens ben met Geert Wilders over de 3-procentsnorm. Een enorme keur aan economen en beleidsmakers, van het IMF, de Amerikaanse regering tot aan allerlei wetenschappers, hebben de afgelopen maanden terecht betoogd dat vasthouden aan een maximaal begrotingstekort van 3 procent van het BBP als recept om “uit de crisis te komen” een vorm van monetaristisch neoliberaal cijferfetisjisme is (zie afbeelding).

Nederland doet het per saldo helemaal niet slecht. De staatsschuld is lang niet zo groot als in vele Europese landen en de VS, de werkloosheid is niet hoog, en ook het begrotingstekort valt in de huidige Europese context echt wel mee. Waar we mee te maken hebben is een economische recessie, en die wordt grotendeels veroorzaakt door een gebrek aan consumentenvertrouwen, door de belachelijk hoge hypotheekschuld in dit land. Die wordt weer veroorzaakt door de hypotheekrenteaftrek, het behoud van welke voor CDA en VVD bij de vorige verkiezingen een breekpunt was. Dát is wat ons nu belemmert, en niet in de eerste plaats de staatsschuld of het begrotingstekort.

Als we weer economische groei willen hebben, is het laatste wat we moeten doen rücksichtlose bezuinigingen doorvoeren, VVD-style. Daar waarschuwt het IMF, nota bene, al tijden tegen. In Europa deelt Duitsland echter de lakens uit, en daar zijn politici aan de macht die in hetzelfde monetaristische cijferfetisjisme geloven als de VVD in Nederland. Dus moet er gehakt worden, ten koste van economische groei. Dit komt voort uit een bewust doorgevoerde beperking van de mogelijkheden van de politiek om de financiële markten af te weren. In plaats van een grotere rol voor de Europese centrale bank, iets waar ze in de VS en Groot-Brittannië wel gebruik van maken, zijn regeringen hier met handen gebonden om het vertrouwen van de markten te behouden. Hun enige optie, bij gebrek aan euro-obligaties of andere mogelijkheden tot verruiming van de acute nood (hoewel het ECB natuurlijk stiekem, tegen de zin van Duitsland en Nederland in, bezig is geweest met geld in het bankensysteem te pompen), is hakken in de begroting. Ten koste van alles.

De Europese Commissie (EC) legt dit ook op, en daar komt dat hele Catshuisberaad uit voort. Wilders en de PvdA, hoewel ze verschillen van mening over hervormingen, merken terecht op dat het ook wel wat rustiger aan kan met die miljarden. Juist om economische groei te stimuleren, in plaats van te dempen. Wilders is een Keynesiaan geworden. Er is heel wat voor te zeggen om in te zetten op hervormingen die op de lange termijn beter zijn, en later het begrotingstekort in evenwicht brengen, dan nu als een malle te gaan hakken.

De PvdA, Wilders, en andere linkse partijen in Nederland staan daarin niet alleen. De mogelijke verkiezingsuitslagen in Frankrijk, met een overwinning van Hollande, wijzen ook in de richting van een voorkeur van het electoraat in die richting. En in Praag wordt er ook flink gedemonstreerd. Iemand als Coen Teulings, directeur van het Centraal Planbureau (CPB), pleit hier al tijden voor. Idem dito Christine Lagarde van het IMF, en Geithner van de Amerikaanse regering. En zelfs kredietbeoordeelaars als Standard & Poor’s zien puur snijden als “kannibalisme”. Zoals de New York Times analyseert: Angela Merkel en haar geestverwanten komen steeds meer alleen te staan.

De vraag – en die vraag speelt al vanaf het begin van de eurocrisis – is hoe lang Duitsland, de EC, en de conservatieven en liberalen die nog de toon zetten met hun nergens in de wereld in deze strikte zin voorkomende monetaristische opvattingen, nog hun zin gaan krijgen. Laat maar lekker een tikje oplopen dat begrotingstekort, zou ik zeggen. Nu alleen inzetten op bezuinigen om die 3 procent maar in no time te halen, zonder structureel te hervormen, richt onherstelbare schade aan aan de economie én aan publieke voorzieningen en de verzorgingsstaat. Wanneer de economie weer groeit, in plaats van krimpt of matig groeit, kan er afgelost worden. En nog beter zou daarbij zijn wanneer de ECB een grotere rol zou krijgen, en/of eurobonds ingesteld zouden worden, zodat de armslag om financiële markten af te weren ook ruimer wordt.

ECB Gaining Bigger Role In Solving The Crisis?

Yet another sign that the northern European conservative and liberal dogmatic creeds against using the ECB as a true central bank are not so widely spread outside their own little hub. Leaving ECB executive board member Lorenzo Smaghi said today that he doesn’t understand the “quasi-religious” discussions about letting the ECB use the money printing press, if necessary, just like every other central bank in the world does.

Note that Smaghi says that the ECB should do this only to combat deflation (and not to reduce unnecessary exposure to the financial markets). Yet it was already predicted a while ago that policymakers would increasingly try to give the ECB a more prominent role in solving the short-term crisis by framing it as an inflationary matter - which is in tune with the central task of the ECB. Also note that the ECB is increasingly pumping money into the tightening European credit system, to battle the credit squeeze.

So slowly, the ECB is after all – despite the resistance of Merkel and the Dutch – gaining a more prominent role in solving the crisis. Let’s hope this continues and, if it’s true, also becomes more openly admitted, so that governments don’t have to fend off the financial markets and impose budget cuts with one hand tied behind their back. To really fix the system, however, the ECB must have a structurally bigger role, f.e. as issuer of eurobonds. Otherwise we’re transferring huge powers to the pan-European level while still being overly exposed to the financial markets, killing economic growth, and not getting any deepening of democracy in return.

Bloomberg:

European Central Bank Executive Board member Lorenzo Bini Smaghi said that policy makers shouldn’t shirk from using quantitative easing if deflation becomes a danger to the euro region.

“I do not understand the quasi-religious discussions about quantitative easing,” Bini Smaghi, who will leave his post at the end of the month, said in an interview published yesterday by the Financial Times. The ECB confirmed the comments. “It is appropriate if economic conditions justify it, in particular in countries facing a liquidity trap that may lead to deflation.”

Unlike the U.S. Federal Reserve and the Bank of England, the ECB has offset liquidity created by purchases of government bonds so that such operations don’t amount to quantitative easing that stokes inflation. ECB Executive Board member Juergen Stark told Germany’s Die Welt newspaper in an interview published today that the central bank doesn’t “have a mandate” for unlimited purchases of government bonds.

Growth prospects in Europe “have deteriorated” since September, U.K. central bank Governor Mervyn King said yesterday after a risk assessment by European officials. Stark, who resigned in September to protest bond purchases, said while the euro-region economy could shrink at the end of 2011, deflation threats are “significantly lower” than after the collapse of Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. in 2008.

(…)

“Central banks are given a clear mandate, to achieve price stability, and the independence to achieve it through the instruments they consider most appropriate,” Bini Smaghi said. “If conditions changed and the need to further increase liquidity emerged, I would see no reason why such an instrument, tailor made for the specific characteristics of the euro area, should not be used.”

(…)

Quantitative easing “is implemented in the U.K. and U.S., where the central banks consider that there are risks of deflation and where the policy rate is constrained by the zero lower bound,” Bini Smaghi said. “This is currently not the case in the euro area because the ECB currently sees no risk of deflation.”

Instead of more bond purchases, the ECB has so far opted to grease the banking system with unlimited liquidity of up to three years, hoping financial institutions will lend the money on to companies and households. The institution loaned banks a record 489 billion euros ($636 billion) for three years on Dec. 21 to avert a credit crunch from the sovereign debt crisis.

The Crisis Of Democracy In Europe

As I’ve blogged before, I’m kinda tired of writing about the eurozone debt crisis. The results of the once again ”crucial” European summit that starts today are fairly predictable: announcements of more, even radical, fiscal discipline and sanction mechanisms across the European Union (or the eurozone), a further integration of tax and labour market policies, and no hopes whatsoever for an expanded role of the ECB in the form of it acting as lender of last resort or as issuer of eurobonds. Everything that Germany wants, happens.

In other words: in order to please the financial markets, only one of the structural deficiencies of the eurozone is being addressed: the disparity in budgetary policies across member states. The other ones - the existence of separate bonds markets and the absence of a true central bank, which leads to Europe’s heightened exposure to the judgment of financial markets and credit rating agencies - are not addressed at all. All this because of Germany’s fear of inflation.

The European debt crisis is now starting to become a democratic crisis as well. This is happening on two levels. First, in order to please the financial markets, “reforms” and budget cuts are being imposed on southern European countries at huge social and economic costs without the population having any say in it. Elected politicians are removed not by elections or the people on the street, but replaced by so-called “technocrats” under pressure of the financial markets. Moreover, across the entire eurozone radically tightened fiscal discipline, which will have a huge bearing on social and economic policies, is being imposed without the population having any say in it; once again, to please the markets. The German, i.e. the conservative/(neo-) liberal policy solution for everything – fiscal discipline, budget cuts and market reforms - is imposed throughout the eurozone by Diktat.

Whether you like this particular economic policy package or not (I’m personally not against it), there’s no escaping the fact that the past months we’ve witnessed a huge shift in sovereignty from democracy to the market. Financial markets dictate what must be done; and it is reinforced by those policy-makers in charge who happen to walk in tune with those markets.

The second level at which democracy is under attack is in the transfer of powers from the national level to the European one. It is by now accepted that the only solution for the eurozone is a further federalization of fiscal, social and economic policies. The European Commission (EC) is likely the institution that will benefit the most from this. Yet, whether you are in favour of the European project or not, the EC is ultimately a technocratic institution; it is a super-regulator that issues “directives” and “regulations” to be imposed uniformly across member states without interference of national parliaments. The European Parliament (EP), the only European institution that is truly democratically legitimized (but only by a minority of voters), does not have the right of initiative; it is the barely legitimized EC that is the one policy ”motor” of the European Union. This situation will only be exacerbated by the current eurozone crisis.

In short, there’s a double crisis of democracy going on: one in the shift of decision-making power from the political sphere to the market, and a second in the transfer of powers from the national level to a barely legitimized European one. In between, the voice of the people is crushed. Particularly worrying is the talk, to be heard here and there, that “democracy” really is just one way to govern a country, that it was a nice experiment, but that it doesn’t really work in an age of globalized financial markets and much-needed technocratic European governance. Have we now really entered a 1930s-style “crisis of democracy”? Is the democratic principle itself being questioned?

To me, the need for a more unified Europe if the single currency is to be saved is clear. But the democratic deficit is getting painful. German solutions mean a half-hearted attempt to create a fully functioning economic zone, but an almost complete transfer of fiscal discretionary powers to an incompletely legitimized supra-European entity. Is that what we want? Do we have any say in that? In my view, the democratic level of the European Union is to be deepened if any of this is the result of current talks. This would mean a broadening of the powers of the EP to become a fully-fledged representative body with legislative powers, as well as finally some concerted effort on the part of European and national policy-makers to promote European democratic institutions amongst the populace. The ECB should also really be allowed to function as a central bank.

Otherwise, the result will be something we have now, but even more overbearing. A soft kind of technocratic regime, composed of an intricate byzantine web of committees, networks, councils and summits and a super-regulator, governed by one particular budgetary philosophy, all the while constricting national discretion to formulate policies, that is whipped from here to there by the financial markets. Even if this solution is, for now, accepted by those financial markets, I don’t think it will hold in the future. And there is no place for democracy in it either.

Eurozone Death Watch

Yesterday and today, lots of ‘authoritative’ newspapers and journals once more published gloomy articles about the coming end of the eurozone, largely due to the perceived inaction of leading (German and other northern European, notably Dutch) politicians. Particularly their refusal to set up the ECB as lender of last resort and/or let it buy state bonds on large scale and/or let it issue eurobonds, and their continued insistence on austerity and budget cuts as the only “solution”, now leading such esteemed organizations as the OECD to condemn their inaction. France is threatened with a credit rating downgrade, as a matter of fact the entire eurozone is threatened with a downgrade, the stability fund doesn’t have nearly enough funds, and… oh well.

I’m getting kinda tired writing about this so maybe I’ll quit doing it, but here goes once more (my bet is on the end of the eurozone before New Year’s Day, by the way)…

Bloomberg (‘The Euro Area Is Coming To An End’, written by the former chief economist of the IMF):

Investors sent Europe’s politicians a painful message last week when Germany had a seriously disappointing government bond auction. It was unable to sell more than a third of the benchmark 10-year bonds it had sought to auction off on Nov. 23, and interest rates on 30-year German debt rose from 2.61 percent to 2.83 percent. The message? Germany is no longer a safe haven.

Since the global financial crisis of 2008, investors have focused on credit risk and rewarded Germany with low interest rates for its perceived frugality. But now markets will focus on currency risk. Inflation will accelerate and the euro may break up in a way that calls into question all euro-denominated obligations. This is the beginning of the end for the euro zone.

Here’s why.

Financial Times:

Germany is the only country in Europe that can act to save the eurozone and the wider European Union from “a crisis of apocalyptic proportions”, the Polish foreign minister warned on Monday in a passionate call for more drastic action to prevent the collapse of the European monetary union.

The extraordinary appeal by Radoslaw Sikorski, delivered in the shadow of the Brandenburg Gate in the German capital, came as the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development called on European leaders to provide “credible and large enough firepower” to halt the sell-off in the eurozone sovereign debt market, or risk a severe recession.

The OECD’s comments came as the organisation slashed its half-yearly forecasts for growth in the world’s richest countries, warning that economic activity in Europe would grind to a near-halt.

Yet their calls were met by a stubborn insistence in Berlin that only EU treaty change to forge a “stability union” in the eurozone would revive confidence in the markets.

Wolfgang Schäuble, German finance minister, rejected calls for the European Central Bank to act as a “lender of last resort” in the eurozone, and for the introduction of jointly guaranteed eurozone bonds to relieve the pressure on the most debt-strapped members of the common currency such as Greece and Italy.

Financieel Dagblad: eindspel om euro is begonnen:

De eurocrisis is in een eindfase gekomen, in beleggerstermen: het eindspel. De ontwikkelingen gaan nu razendsnel, en de tijd dat de sterke eurolanden de zwakke konden redden, is voorbij. Volgens veel economen is het een kwestie van weken, misschien van dagen, en dan moet er iets op tafel liggen om het uiteenvallen van de euro te voorkomen.

Over negen dagen houden de Europese leiders nog maar eens een ‘top der toppen’. Er was er al een op 21 juli, op 23 oktober en op 26 oktober. Maar nu leeft meer dan ooit het gevoel dat het erop of eronder is. De reeds geplande Brusselse top van vrijdag 9 december is inmiddels uitgebreid met een werkdiner op de avond ervoor. Er is immers veel te bespreken.

(…)

Columns in de Financial Times en commentaren in The Economist waarschuwen inmiddels dat de euro snel verleden tijd kan zijn. Jean Pisani-Ferry, directeur van de gerenommeerde Brusselse denktank Bruegel, stelt onderkoeld dat er ‘een nieuwe situatie in Europa’ is ontstaan. Met iets meer gevoel voor dramatiek schrijft de Vlaamse econoom Paul De Grauwe: ‘De euro heeft nog enkele weken om zichzelf te redden, terwijl verschillende instituties zich al voorbereiden op de klap.’

Wat de situatie nu zo wezenlijk anders maakt dan enkele weken geleden? Verreweg het belangrijkste signaal is dat zelfs Duitsland meer moeite heeft om zijn staatsleningen in de markt kwijt te raken. En opvallend, direct na de half mislukte emissie van vorige week verloor de euro in een tel 0,72 eurocent in waarde. Voor centrale bankiers een serieuze aanwijzing dat de munt zelf het volgende doelwit zal zijn.

(…)

Het is bijna tragisch dat de ministers van financiën vanavond alweer naar Brussel moeten afreizen om over het noodfonds te praten. Nog altijd zijn de afspraken van 21 juli (uitbreiding van noodinstrumentarium) niet in werking getreden, en nu zwoegen ze op de deal van 26 oktober (vergroting slagkracht). Het fonds heeft nog ongeveer € 250 mrd beschikbaar, maar niemand gelooft meer dat daar € 1000 mrd van te maken is, zoals een maand geleden werd beloofd.

(…)

Inmiddels is duidelijk dat het beleggers helemaal niet meer uitmaakt dat de betrouwbare technocraat Mario Monti als premier is aangetreden. Net zomin als zijn bezuinigingsplannen nog indruk maken. Het is de les van twee jaar eurocrisis: paniek en wantrouwen slaan niet met enkele ferme politieke daden om in volledig vertrouwen. Voor België dreigt hetzelfde lot. Verrassend genoeg reageerden beleggers maandag positief op het nieuws dat er na anderhalf jaar eindelijk een regering komt. Maar de aanstaande premier Elio Di Rupo kan de snel opgelopen rentelasten voor België waarschijnlijk niet zomaar ongedaan maken. Ook hij zal ervaren dat eenmaal afgehaakte beleggers niet snel tevreden zijn.

Volkskrant:

De euro is een misgeboorte en had beter niet ingevoerd kunnen worden. Dat zegt oud-AFM-topman Hans Hoogervorst in een aflevering van het geschiedenisprogramma Andere Tijden, die op 11 december wordt uitgezonden.

Hoogervorst zegt daarin: ‘De enorme problemen die we nu hebben op de kapitaalmarkten en de enorme risico’s die worden gelopen, als we dat tevoren hadden geweten, dan denk ik niet dat iemand bij zijn volle verstand eraan was begonnen.’

Volgens Hoogervorst kan de munt ‘wel als mislukt’ kan worden beschouwd.

Enzovoort.

Dutch Government Supports Bigger ECB Role

Minister De Jager (r) measuring up the size of the ECB’s new role.

And now Merkel is alone. Even the Dutch government (along with the Finnish) now grudgingly supports a bigger role for the ECB in solving the debt crisis (if any solution other than a grand eurozone conflagration is still at hand). They call it a ’last resort’, but you don’t put messages like this out in the open if you’re not seriously considering it – or even have already committed to it. Of course, this role can vary from buying up state bonds in larger amounts to introducing the much-called for eurobonds.

Finance minister De Jager’s message is spun differently by some Dutch news outlets, by the way (but similarly by others).

My bet is on the 60 percent option: creating eurobonds covering a maximum of 60 percent GDP. Beyond that it’s lousy national bonds for profligate nations. Combine this with a stringent system of fiscal discipline (also advocated by the Dutch government for a while now) and maybe some solution is there. Although a system totally consisting of eurobonds might be better (but has its own drawbacks, such as added costs for taxpayers in some countries).

But to be honest: I think it’s too late anyway.

Financial Times:

Jan Kees de Jager, the Dutch finance minister, endorsed a more active role for the European Central Bank “as a last resort” to contain the eurozone debt crisis ahead of a meeting in Berlin with his counterparts from Germany and Finland.

In a hearing of the Dutch parliament’s finance committee, Mr de Jager said that the other firewall measures seem to be failing, with European countries unwilling to contribute more funds themselves to the European Financial Stability Fund, and private investors uninterested in the plan agreed to by European leaders on October 26 of leveraging the fund up to an effective capacity of €1,000bn.

If neither of those measures succeed, leaving ECB intervention the only plausible course, then “in the end, something has to happen”, Mr de Jager said.

On Wednesday, the Finnish finance minister, Jutta Urpilainen, also moderated her stance, saying, “If all else fails, we have to reflect on the role of the ECB.”

The Netherlands and Finland have until now hewed close to Germany’s position of opposing major intervention by the ECB as part of a firewall against the spreading eurozone debt crisis but appear to be taking a more pragmatic line.

The Dutch share German scepticism that any ECB firewall would merely “fight the symptoms” of the debt crisis, and say that the top priority is creating a strict Europe-wide budget authority to force Greece, Italy, Spain and other at-risk eurozone countries to cut their deficits and implement economic reforms.

But as the urgency mounts, many voices in the Dutch economics and business community are pressing the government to take a more assertive tack.

On Sunday, a group of four top Dutch economists wrote to Mark Rutte, prime minister, urging him to press European leaders to commit to contributing more directly to the EFSF and to supporting an ECB role. The group included Lex Hoogduin, who stepped down this year as the number two official at the Dutch central bank.

“I hope the Dutch authorities, who are very close in their philosophy to Germany, can convince the Germans that there is a role for the ECB,” Mr Hoogduin told the Financial Times. He said markets had lost faith that European leaders will come up with the funds to support southern European countries, even if those countries do comply with budget-cutting and governance reforms.

Het einde van de eurozone?

The Guardian schrijft dat er al maanden gesprekken gaande zijn om de eurozone toch maar op te breken. Nu de rente op Italiaanse obligaties torenhoog is, en er zeker geen kans is op een bail out van Italië door het Europees noodfonds, komt een ’herstructurering’ van Italiaanse schulden (d.w.z. een half bankroet) in zicht. Dat treft de Franse financiële mega-conglomeraten hard, betekent een monsterrecessie, en waarschijnlijk het einde van de euro.

Wtf! Opbreken van de eurozone? Say what? Het lijkt erop dat de negatiefste voorspellingen van commentatoren stuk voor stuk uitkomen. De totale ellende is inmiddels niet meer te overzien.

Het lijkt er ook steeds meer op dat er een realisering ontstaat dat het door Merkel, de ECB en het IMF voorgeschreven programma van “bezuinigen” als panacée voor alle problemen niet de weg is. Je kunt bezuinigen wat je wil, maar speculanten op de financiële markten geloven er toch niet in. Sterker nog, ze hebben er belang bij als de boel onderuit gaat. Bovendien wordt landen onder curatele stellen en de hele verzorgingsstaat wegbezuinigen op een gegeven moment ook ondemocratisch; wat dat betreft is het jammer dat dat Griekse referendum er niet gekomen is, dan konden ze tenminste kiezen.

Wilders heeft gelijk gehad: Griekenland had bij het begin van de crisis al uit de eurozone gekickt moeten worden, i.c.m. schuldherstructurering en een terugkeer van dit land naar een eigen monetair systeem. Zoals een LSD-reaguurder schrijft:

Misschien een interessant alternatief voor het hameren van Merkel en de ECB op een uitgebalanceerd huishoudboekje voor Griekenland, met als gevolg elkaar versterkende opeenvolgende bezuinigingen en hemeltergende werkloosheidscijfers enkel om de schuldeisers te plezieren: laat Griekenland de weg van Argentiniė volgen! Dus een gecontroleerd bankroet en herstructurering van schulden (plus een vertrek uit de euro), zodat het land weer kan investeren en ja, ook werk maken van hervormingen en een minder gestoord belastingsysteem opzetten. Hebben ze ook geen vaste wisselkoers meer. Voorheen alleen de positie van de PVV en SP, nu hoor je het vaker.

Een klein landje kan zich terugtrekken uit de financiële markten, zich minder afhankelijk maken van speculanten en geld bijdrukken, zodat er weer geïnvesteerd kan worden i.p.v. alle economische groei op recept van het IMF en Noord-Europese liberalen kapotbezuinigen. Wellicht dat de crisis dan niet was verspreid naar Italië. Maar nu is het te laat voor deze optie (al kan het nog steeds als de hele euro uit elkaar klapt).

Het enige alternatief nu? De ECB staatsobligaties laten opkopen, en instellen als lender of last resort. Dat wil zeggen dat de ECB gaat functioneren zoals de centrale bank doet in normale economieën. De eurozone is een mislukt project gebleken, omdat landen met uiteenlopende economieën én aparte obligaties niet kunnen functioneren onder een regime dat één munt hanteert. Amerikaanse economen roepen het al maanden, en misschien wordt het tijd dat dit ook eens doordringt in Europa. De EMU in haar huidige vorm kan niet bestaan.

Dat betekent dus “meer Europa”. Want als je dat doet, moet je je economische systeem ook verder integreren. Duitsland wil geen ECB als lender of last resort, omdat ze bang zijn voor inflatie. Maar het is dit, of het opbreken van de eurozone. De heilloze weg van het voorschrijven van bezuinigingen, leidend tot nieuwe vertrouwenscrises en weer nieuwe landen die de prooi worden van speculanten (Frankrijk?) moet in ieder geval verlaten worden.

Will Europe Implode?

Andrew Sullivan contrasts two takes on the future of the euro, the European Monetary Union, and the world financial system: one optimistic, and one very pessimistic. I’d suggest to read them both: each provides a good account of what’s currently at stake. But I don’t know which of them is more realistic. In a few weeks or months we’ll know, I guess.

- Edit: From hilmerv come two more interesting articles. One is of Paul Krugman in the NYT, making (once again) the Keynesian argument that austerity measures and budgets in Europe are worsening the crisis rather than ameliorating it. The other is from the Center for Economic and Policy Research, arguing that China will have to come to the rescue because of the refusal of policy-makers to invest rather than make budget cuts.

- Original post: First the pessimistic one, from The Economist:

TWO significant messages emerged from the weekend’s IMF meetings that are both striking in their own right and which, when set against each other, are deeply disconcerting. On the one hand, journalists seem to be unable to describe the meetings without noting the high level of fear and anxiety among the participants. (The Financial Times‘ Wolfgang Münchau closes his column today by saying, “I have never seen Europe’s policymakers as scared as I saw them in Washington last week.) Along those lines, leaders came away from the meetings promising bold action by early November, including agreements on steps to recapitalise banks and increase the capacity of the European Financial Stability Facility. The message seems to be that officials have been scared into a recognition of the severity of the world’s problems and are now prepared to act.

Yet the day’s headlines carry another message: the euro zone is riven by conflict and unable to agree on the most basic of rescue measures. Euro-zone governments are still struggling to put in place an agreement reached in July. Some officials insist that Greece’s creditors must take much larger haircuts than those assumed in that deal, while Greek leaders continue to argue that they will not default. Observers are biting their nails over looming parliamentary votes on the plan to increase the EFSF, even as it becomes clear that a rise to €440 billion isn’t sufficient. On the one hand, it’s as clear as ever that the euro zone needs a massive, ambitious policy to avoid a catastrophic financial scenario. And on the other, it seems ever less likely that the euro zone’s leaders can agree on such a policy and muster the domestic political support to ratify and implement it. If Europe simply can’t do what it needs to do, that leaves the euro zone, and the world, facing a very dark economic reality.

This reality could scarcely come at a worse time. Europe is sliding toward recession. America is uncomfortably close to following behind. Even in the absence of a major financial shock, a renewed downturn across major economies would be very painful, given the lack of recovery in many labour markets and the stress contraction places on budgets. Were a double-dip to strike, far fewer economies would have the political will to intervene to support the economy, even among those with the fiscal room to help.

It’s just shocking to think about the dangers that loom and consider the extent to which they’re driven by governmental failures. Despite having been in a state of constant crisis for more than a year, the euro zone is far away from a real solution; the politics may be such that no solution is possible without a dramatic, Lehman-like collapse, at which point it may be too late to save the euro zone. Meanwhile, the European Central Bank blundered into policy tightening, seriously worsening the crisis out of a fear of mild and temporary inflation. Leaders elsewhere have hardly done better. America’s fiscal policymaking has steadily deteriorated, and the Congress needlessly sent confidence tumbling over the summer with a battle over the government’s debt ceiling. At the same time, Ben Bernanke seems to have forgotten everything he once knew about the crises in the 1930s and in Japan in the 1990s. America is sinking back toward recession while the global economy nears a cliff, and the Fed—by its own acknowledgment—has plenty of heavy ammunition sitting untouched on the shelf.

It is a damning performance. If the world economy does indeed face a new crisis and a new contraction in the weeks ahead, rich-world citizens will have every reason to question the institutions of global capitalism. If the liberal order begins to falter, even darker times still may lie ahead.

Gloomy indeed. Here’s the optimistic one, from the Daily Beast:

So the question is, will Europe implode? Contrary to the widespread assumption, I think not.

It isn’t just that Angela Merkel, Germany’s answer to Margaret Thatcher, has drawn what for her is an unequivocal line that Greece will not leave the European Union or the euro zone. It’s that slowly, sloppily, the governments of Europe are awakening to the realization that since they have tethered their collective economic fate to each other, the costs of unraveling are so immense as to be untenable. No government feels comfortable demanding more funds to bail out Greece or shore up banks or create a backstop for the tenuous finances of Italy. But each government understands at some animalistic level that no electorate will celebrate the consequences of doing too little. Even those supposedly dour, disapproving burghers of Düsseldorf who are tired of bailing out what they see as profligate Greeks would blanch at the market consequences of the end of the euro. Germany doesn’t just pay to maintain that union; it benefits mightily as well.

There is no way to prove that the officials of the EU will access their better angels at the last moment (however auspiciously named the German chancellor is). But this crisis is shaping up as the European version of the American debt-ceiling debate: messy, disheartening, but when pushed to stare at the alternatives, deeply clarifying.

Hence the lurch in the past days toward a more explicit, aggressive response, ranging from a more robust stabilization fund, to plans and statements from German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schaeuble to new IMF head Christine Lagarde that suggest at the least a recognition that this won’t magically resolve itself. Yes, the German minister has to speak cautiously, ahead of an important vote on bailout money on Thursday, and yes, Lagarde has been a study in rhetorical excess, but still, no one is in denial and most now recognize what is at stake.

(…)

To expect the resolution to be easy is foolish, but to assume that dissolution is the inevitable outcome after generations have fought and striven—that, too, is foolish. The formation of the union was never widely or easily digested, but neither was the carving together of the United States in the early to mid-19th century.

The risk remains that globally, because of Europe, we are on a precipice and will fall. That needs to be factored into any near-term decision about money, business, and economic outlook. But the costs of dissolution are prohibitive, for Europe and for the world. China, Brazil, India, the new creditor nations of the world, have begun the unthinkable conversation about bailing out Europe if Europe will not bail out itself: an unlikely event but indicative of how serious this is. In the end, it is those costs for Germany, for France, and for the entire euro zone that should act as a bulwark against the worst-case scenario.

Any thoughts?

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